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Suit was filed in city court' for $795.60. Defendant admitted
owing the $795.60 but reconvened alleging plaintiff had breached
a contract for timely delivery of goods resulting in damages of
$1,566.00. Defendant thus sought judgment for an adjusted
balance of $770.40. The city court sustained plaintiff's excep-
tion of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because
the amount in dispute exceeded the $1,000.00 jurisdictional limit
of the city court. Held, the effective sum demanded in recon-
vention was $770.40, which is within the jurisdictional amount
of the city court. Clark Equipment Co. v. Southern Mechanical
Contractors, Inc., 203 So.2d 387 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
Reconventional demands in these courts are governed by
Code of Civil Procedure article 1036:
"A court shall have the jurisdiction over an incidental
demand only if it would have had jurisdiction over the
demand had it been instituted in a separate suit."'2
To determine whether the demand is within the jurisdictional
limit of the court, one must refer to Code of Civil Procedure
article 4 to determine the amount in dispute:
"Where the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter
of an action depends upon the amount in dispute, or value
of the right asserted, it shall be determined by the amount
demanded or value asserted in good faith by the plaintiff."
The sole issue on appeal was whether the amount in dispute was
the full $1,566.00 defendant alleged plaintiff owed or only the
$770.40 adjusted balance defendant sought.
1. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4834 (1960) provides: "The civil jurisdiction of city
courts where the population within their respective territorial jurisdiction is
twenty thousand or more is concurrent with that of districts courts in cases
where the amount in dispute, or the value of the movable property involved,
does not exceed one thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and attorney's
fees .... "
2. Id. art. 1036 continues: "The only exceptions to this rule are those
provided in the state constitution.
"The mode of procedure employed in the incidental action shall be the
same as that used in the principal action, except as otherwise provided by
law."
The Comment following article 1036 states that "the exception referred
to in the second sentence are those set forth In Const. Art. VII, §§ 91, 92,




This case appears to be one of first impression in Louisiana.
Article 1036 was new with the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure8
and there have been few cases interpreting it. Although most
jurisprudence arising under article 4 has involved other aspects
of jurisdictional amount,4 some pre-1960 cases have dealt with
problems similar to that in the instant case.
In 1944 the Second Circuit stated that "it is perfectly true
that jurisdiction must be determined upon the basis of the real
amount in dispute."5 This tendency to look to the real amount
in dispute between the parties was followed in Harrison v. Craw-
ford.6 There the plaintiff sued in a city court with a maximum
jurisdictional limit of $300.00 to recover a deposit of $120.00
made on the $1,190.00 purchase price of realty. The court of
appeal held that the amount in dispute was in excess of $300.00
since the court would have had to rule on the validity of the
alleged contract in its entirety to determine plaintiff's right
to the $120.00.7
Koerner v. Francingues,8 a 1925 decision, presented a fact
situation very close to that of the present case. Plaintiff there
sued in a city court with a maximum jurisdictional amount of
$300.00 to recover $283.25 allegedly due from a contract of sale.
Defendant answered that plaintiff owed him $388.00 from an-
other contract and sought to offset $283.25 of this amount against
plaintiff's claim. The court ruled:
"But the defendant argues that he is pleading in com-
pensation only 'so much of which amount as may be neces-
sary to offset plaintiff's claim.' That is immaterial as this
court would have to examine and pass upon a claim in excess
of $300.00. If this court decided this claim in compensation
3. Article 1036 merely codifies the established Louisiana jurisprudence.
See Cross v. Parent, 26 La. Ann. 591 (1874); Heirs of Kempe v. Hunt, 4 La.
477 (1832); Standard Tile & Marble Co. v. Gray, 85 So.2d 356 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1956); Artic Pure Ice Co. v. Rathe, 3 La. App. 14 (Orl. Cir. 1925); Kauf-
man v. Mahen, 2 La. App. 354 (Orl. Cir. 1925); Feahney v. New Orleans Rail-
ways & Light Co., 4 Orl. App. 277 (La. App. 1907); Labarthe v. Mazzei, 2 Orl.
App. 367 (La. App. 1905).
4 See the cases annotated following article 4 in 2 LA. CODe Civ. P. ANN.
25-29 (West 1960).
5. Richmond v. Newson, 17 So.2d 735, 736 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
6. 29 So.2d 602 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1947).
7. This case is to be distinguished from Tenaha Oil Co. v. Caraway, 171
So.2d 683 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), and similar cases where the court was able
to settle a dispute within its jurisdictional limits without deciding the larger
dispute and consideration of the larger dispute would have involved the
rights of third parties.
8. 3 Orl. App. 220 (La. App. 1925).
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only up to $283.25 it might leave undecided the balance
of the claim for another court to pass upon. Claims cannot
be divided up in this manner."9 (Emphasis added.)
Although none of these pre-1960 cases directly involved the
present issue, they indicate that Louisiana courts in the past
have looked at the entire amount actually in dispute between
the parties.
The effect of reconventional demands on jurisdictional
amount has been examined in three other jurisdictions.10 All
three have held that in determining the amount in dispute on a
cross-claim or reconventional demand, the plaintiff's claim can-
not be credited to the reconventional demand to reduce that
demand to an amount within the jurisdiction of the court."
Under a fact situation identical with the present case,12 the
Supreme Court of Texas reasoned in the 1896 case of Gimbel V.
Gomprecht: 13
"The plea in reconvention filed by the defendant in this
case was in effect a suit by them against the plaintiffs, and
the amount in controversy was the damages claimed in that
plea; that is, the actual damages, $797.21, and exemplary
damages, $966-aggregating $1,763.21. The fact that the debt
of the plaintiffs was admitted to be due, and agreed to be
taken as a credit upon the claim set up by the defendants,
did not lessen the amount that was put in controversy by
that plea. Under the plea, the defendants must establish their
damages before they are entitled to have the amount of the
plaintiffs' debt satisfied by their damages so recovered."' 4
9. Id. at 221.
10. Arkansas: Jones v. Blythe, 138 Ark. 81, 210 S.W. 348 (1919); Colorado:
Dyett v. Harney, 53 Colo. 381, 127 P. 226 (1912); Texas: Gimbel v. Gomprecht,
89 Tex. 497, 35 S.W. 470 (1896).
11. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 66, at 85 (1940), states the rule: "By the weight of
authority, however, in an action on a claim for an amount within its juris-
diction, a court does not have jurisdiction of a cross demand which exceeds
its maximum jurisdiction; and such cross demand cannot be reduced to an
amount within the jurisdiction of the court by crediting plaintiff's claim
thereon .... "
12. Plaintiff had sued for $764.00 in a county court with a maximum
jurisdictional limit of $1,000.00. Defendant admitted owing this amount but
alleged that he was due $1,763.21 from the plaintiff and demanded the differ-
ence of $999.21.
13. 89 Tex. 497, 498, 35 S.W. 470 (1896).
14. This early decision has been consistently followed in the Texas courts.
See Manly v. Citizens Nat. Bank in Abilene, 110 S.W.2d 993 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Turner v. Larson, 72 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Brook Mays &
Co. v. Osborne, 70 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Commercial Inv. Trust,
Inc. v. Smart, 69 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Nichols v. Ellis, 246 S.W.
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The majority in the present case, in ruling that the amount
in dispute was only the adjusted balance of $770.40, emphasized
the words in Code of Civil Procedure article 4, referring to
jurisdictional amount, that "it shall be determined by the amount
demanded" and "demanded by the plaintiff."'15 The majority
opinion stated that "plaintiff in reconvention never 'demanded'
$1,566.00" and that "[$770.40] is the only sum 'demanded' either
in the allegations or prayer of the reconventional demand."'16
The court quoted from the reconventional demand of the defen-
dant to show that the only judgment sought was one for $770.40.17
As the dissenting opinion'8 pointed out, however, plaintiff's denial
that it owed $1,566.00 put that amount in dispute and the city
court would in fact be passing on the validity of a $1,566.00
claim. This was the amount of damages asserted by the defen-
dant for an alleged breach of contract and this was the amount
of the dispute that the court was called upon to settle.
The majority opinion also quoted 9 without further com-
ment Code of Civil Procedure article 106220 dealing with com-
pensation. The Louisiana Civil Code allows compensation only
in cases of debts "equally liquidated and demandable." 21 Since
713, 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (where the error was referred to as "funda-
mental"); Billings v. Southern Supply Co., 194 S.W. 1170 (Tex. Civ. App.
1917); Pennybacker v. Hazlewood, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 183, 61 S.W. 153 (1901).
The Supreme Court of Colorado arrived at the same result on similar
facts In Dyett v. Harney, 53 Colo. 381, 127 P. 226 (1912); and the Arkansas
Supreme Court stated this to be the rule in Jones v. Blythe, 138 Ark. 81, 210
S.W. 348 (1919).
15. 203 So.2d 387, 388. The phrase "demanded by the plaintiff" Is found
In the second paragraph of LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4 (1960): "Except as other-
wise provided by law, the amount in dispute consists of the principal sum,
and the attorney's fees and penalties provided by agreement or by law, de-
manded by the plaintiff. Interest and court costs are not a part of the
amount in dispute."
16. Id. at 389.
17. Id. at 388-89.
18. Id. at 389. Judge Gladney dissented: "The proceedings, in my
opinion, presented to the trial court a controversy and dispute over the
sum of $1,566.00. . . . In view of the denial by the plaintiff in the main
demand that it owes $1,566.00, that amount Is in dispute and subject to
the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. arts. 4 and 1036."
19. 1d. at 388.
20. LA. CODs Civ. P. art. 1062 (1960): "Compensation may be asserted In the
reconventional demand."
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2209 (1870): "Compensation takes place only be-
tween two debts, having equally for their object a sum of money, or a
certain quantity of consumable things of one and the same kind, and
which are equally liquidated and demandable .... " See also arts. 2207-2216.
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these debts do not fit in this description, 22 it is submitted that
article 1062 has no bearing on the principal case.
The majority holding in this case appears undesirable for
three reasons. First, the plaintiff is forced to defend against a
breach of contract action with alleged damages of over $1,000.00
in a court that ordinarily would lack jurisdiction. In addition,
until this dispute is settled, the plaintiff is denied a judgment
for the sum originally sued for and which defendant admits he
owes. Second, the rule laid down by the majority in this case
might apply to other situations with undesirable results. The
drafters of the Code of Civil Procedure did not anticipate city
courts hearing disputes in excess of $1,000.00. To allow them
to do so might raise problems not anticipated nor provided for
by the Code.23
Finally, the ruling in the principal case seems contrary to
the purpose and policy behind city courts in Louisiana. These
courts were established to decide relatively minor cases in a
speedy and efficient manner. The limitations upon their power 24
22. In the principal case the claim of the plaintiff was admitted while
the claim of the defendant was denied and not yet proven. They were
therefore not "equally liquidated and demandable." See Beyer Transp. Co. v.
Whiteman Contracting Co., 187 So. 143 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1939); Brock v.
Natalbany Lumber Co., 179 So. 322 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938); Reynaud v.
His Creditors, 4 Rob. 514 (La. 1843). For a brief summary of compensation
and its relation to reconvention, see Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 220, 224 (1960).
23. E.g., LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4837 (1960) limits the power of city courts
to issue injunctive orders. Perhaps the drafters would not have placed this
limitation on the city courts if it had been foreseen they might be deciding
disputes in excess of $1,000.00.
24. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4836 (1960): "A justice of the peace, or city
court other than one in New Orleans, has no jurisdiction of any of the
following cases or proceedings:
"(1) A case involving title to immovable property, the right to public
office or position, or civil or political rights;
"(2) A case in which it is sought to obtain a judgment of annulment
of marriage, separation from bed and board, divorce, separation of property,
or for alimony;
"(3) A succession, tutorship, curatorship, emancipation, partition, re-
ceivership, liquidation, habeas corpus, or quo warranto proceeding;
"(4) A case in which the state, a parish, municipal, or other political
corporation, or a succession, is a defendant:
"(5) Any other case or proceeding excepted from the jurisdiction of
these courts by law.
"New Orleans city courts have no jurisdiction of any of the cases or
proceedings enumerated in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (5) of this article."
This article merely restates the provisions of LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 35, 48,
91, 92. The second paragraph of LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4837 (1960) states:
"A justice of the peace or city court may not issue any injunctive order
except to arrest the execution of its own writ."
It could be argued that since LA. CONST. art. VII, § 51, limits the juris-
diction of city courts in cities containing 20,000 population or more to
cases where the amount in dispute does not exceed $1,000.00 inclusive of
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indicate a strong desire on the part of the legislature that these
courts should not decide large disputes. This desire was expressly
recognized by at least one of our appellate courts in the previ-
ously mentioned case of Koerner v. Francingues.25 The effect of
the majority ruling in the instant case would be to expand the
jurisdiction of these courts by allowing them to hear cases where
the amount actually in dispute may greatly exceed their maxi-
mum jurisdictional limit. This could lead to crowding of city
court calendars and the defeat of their primary purpose. For the
reasons given above it is submitted that the dissenting opinion
in the principal case is the correct one and should be followed.
James R. Pettway
EXPROPRIATION-ACTIONS EX DELICTO FOR
UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION
The Highway Department expropriated a temporary servi-
tude on defendant's land to obtain fill for an interstate highway.
After the vesting of title and withdrawal of the $37,000 deposit,
the Department filed an amended petition seeking to accom-
modate local industry by changing the location of the borrow
pit to another part of defendant's land. The condemnee timely
objected to the procedure and the condemnor's amended petition
was set aside. The Highway Department, however, proceeded
to remove dirt from the new location. After the earth had been
removed, the landowners brought an action ex delicto seeking
damages for trespass and conversion. The court of appeal held
that the trial court erred in denying damages in the same
amount as would be determined by ex delicto or article 507
standards, and increased the award to a net $111,000. The Lou-
isiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that recovery would be
restricted to just compensation as in an ordinary action to
interest and attorney's fees while the other sections of the constitution
speak of amounts exclusive of such interest and fees, the drafters of the
constitution intended this to be a further limitation on this class of city
courts. The more likely explanation of this difference in terms, however,
is that expressed by McMahon in the introduction to LA. R.S. ANN.-CODE
Civ. P. bk. VIII, tit. 1 (West 1960): "The word 'inclusive' in the constitu-
tional provision is actually due to a typographical error in an earlier amend-
ment, retained by subsequent amendments . . . . [T]he Louisiana State
Law Institute intended to recommend the amendment of this constitutional
provision to correct the error; but through inadvertence such a recommen-
dation was not submitted to the Legislature in 1960."
25. 3 Orl. App. 220 (La. App. 1925). See material and following dis-
cussion referred to by note 8 supra.
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